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IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals . of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND. 
Record No. 1659 
JOSEPH WRIGHT, AN INFANT SUING BY CAFE·LIA 
FOREMAN, HIS NEXT FRIEND, 
Plaintiff-in-Error, 
versus 
JOE P·ERRY, J. R. WRIGHT, AND C. A. WRIGHT, 
Defendants-in-Error. 
To the Honorable Justices of the Sttpren~e Court of Appeals 
of V i'rginia: 
The petition of Joseph Wright, an infant, suing by Cafelia 
Foreman, his next friend, respectfully represents unto the 
Court that he is aggrieved by a final judgment of the Cir-
cuit Court of Norfolk County, Virginia, rendered on the 30th 
day of 1\farch, 1935, in an action at law in which your peti-
tioner 'vas plaintiff, and Joe Perry, J. R. Wright and C. A. 
Wright were defendants. The transcript of the record in the 
trial court i~ here·with presented. 
THE FACTS. 
This is an action for personal injuries resulting from a 
collision that occurred at nig·ht on .August 27th, 1934, on the 
new Suffolk-Portsmouth Boulevard in Norfolk County, Vir-
ginia, about 200-300 yards East of the U and I Cabins, be-
tween an automobile driven by the plaintiff and a truck op-
erated by the defendant, Joe Perry, as the servant of the 
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other two defendants. As the result of the collision the left 
arm of the plaintiff was so badly mangled that it had to be 
amputated just below the shoulder. There were three trials 
of the case; the first time there was a hung jury; the second 
time there was a verdict for $2,000.00 for the plaintiff; 
and the third time there 'vas a verdict for the defendants. 
The record shows the evidence introduced at the second trial, 
that is the trial which resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff 
for $2,000.00. Inasmuch as th~ verdict at that trial was 
for the plaintiff the evidence will be stated briefly as favor-
able to the plaintiff as it was developed at the trial. The 
plaintiff was driving a Chevrolet Sedan East towards Ports-
mouth at about 20-25 miles per hour, 'vell over on his right 
side of the road, and never got to the left of the center. of 
the road. 'fhe truck driven and owned by the defendants 
was proceeding at a very high rate of speed West towards 
Suffolk. It had a large body about 8 feet high and extending 
about two feet beyond the line of the front fender extremes 
on each side. ':J.1here were no marker lights on the truck body 
at the top left and rig·ht hand corners. The truck that had 
been traveling· on its right side of the road, just before it got 
opposite to the plaintiff's car, cut to its left into the plain-
tiff's car. The first point of the impact on the truck ·was the 
forward point of the overhang on the left side of the body. 
The first point of the impact on the plaintiff's car was the 
left front door. The left front wheel of the plaintiff's car 
· was thus pulled into and under the truck where it came in 
contact with the left rear dual 'vheels of the truck, breaking 
down the left front wheel of the plaintiff's car. The plain-
tiff's car stopped immediately, and after the accident was 
standing entirely to its right of the center of the road. The 
evidence is conflicting as to how far the truck ran after the 
accident, varying· from not less than 150 feet to 200-300 yards. 
As heretofore stated this second trial, which occurred De-
cember 18 and 19, 1934, resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff 
for $2,000.00. On motion of the defendants the Court, over 
the exceptions of the plaintiff, set aside this verdict because 
of his action in reference to Instruction A as· set forth in 
Certificate of Exceptions #3, and granted a new trial. There-
upon the third trial was had, resulting in a verdict for the 
defendants. Thereupon the plaintiff moved the Oourt to set 
aside the second verdict (third trial), to vacate the order 
setting aside the first verdict (second trial), and to render 
judgment for the plaintiff on the first verdict, which motion 
was overruled, to which action of the Gourt the plaintiff duly 
~xcepted. 
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ASSIGN~fENTS OF ERROR. 
(1) The Court erred in setting aside the first verdict and 
granting a new trial. 
(2) The Court erred in refusing to render judgment for 
the plaintiff on the first verdict. 
( 3) The Court erred in refusing to set aside the second 
verdict, and in refusing to vacate the order setting aside the 
first verdict, and in refusing to render judgment for the 
plaintiff on the first verdict and in rendering for the defend-
ant on the second verdict. 
ARGUMENT. 
I. IF THE TRIAL COURT ERRE·D IN SETTING ASIDE 
THE FIRST VERDICT THE PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED 
TO FINAL JUDGNIENT ON THE F'IRST VERDICT. 
All the above assignments of error depend upon whether 
or not thB Court erred in setting aside the first verdict, re-
sulting from the trial of December 18 and 19, 1934. It may 
be adn1itted that if the Court was correct in setting aside 
the first verdict, then there is no error shown in sustaining 
the second verdict, since the record as presented does not 
preserve the incidents of the subsequent trial at which the 
second verdict was rendered. · 
On the other hand, if the lo,ver Court was in error in set-
ting aside the first verdict, then this Court should set aside 
all proceedings subsequent to the first verdict and render 
final judgment for the plaintiff on the first verdict. Clark 
v. Hugo, 130 Va. 99; Norfolk Southern Railway Com.pany v. 
Mabe, 146 Va. 813. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SETTING ASIDE 
THE FIRST VERDICT. 
We will consider this subject under the heading·s cor-
responding with the grounds assigned by the defendants in 
their motion to set aside the verdict found in Certificate of 
·Exceptions No. 4 starting at page 28 of the typewritten 
record. 
1. In Reference to I nstnwtion A. 
The action of the trial Court in setting aside the first ver-
dict was based on his action in reference to Instruction A 
as offered by the defendant, set forth in Certificate of 
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Exceptions No. 3 (page 26 of the typewritten record). The 
instruction as offered reads as follows : 
''The Court instructs the jury that you can not return a 
verdict in favor of the plaintiff in this case if you believe 
from the evidence that he was guilty of any act of negligence 
that caused or proxin1ately contributed to the cause of the 
accident, ho,vever slight his negligence may have so con-
tributed, and your verdict n1ust be in favor of the defend-
ants, even though you may believe that they, the defendants, 
also were guilty of neg·ligence. '' 
The plaintiff objected to this instruction on the follow-
ing grounds, as stated in the above mentioned certificate; 
(1) The phrase "however slight" was not proper and would 
mislead the jury; and ( 2) The latter part of the instruction 
directs a verdict for the defendant irrespective of whether 
the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence, or at 
least the instruction does not make it clear that the direc-
tion of a verdict for the defendants is dependent upon the 
jury believing that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory 
negligence. 
Thereupon the Court amended the instruction and granted 
it in the following words: 
''The Court instructs the jury that you can not return a 
verdict in favor of the plaintiff in this case if you believe from 
the evidence that he was guilty of any act of negligence that 
caused, or proximately contributed to the cause of the acci-
dmit. '' 
(1) So far as concerns the first objection to the instruction, 
as offered, namely, the expression "however slight" as ap· 
plied to contributory negligence, the Court of Appeals has 
disapproved the use of the expression. See Clinchfield Coal 
Cor11. v. Osborne, 114 Va. 13, wherein the Court says at page 
16: 
''Objection is taken to the action of the court in refusing' 
instruction No. 13, asked for by the defendant. This in-
struction '\vas directed to the doctrine of contributory negli-
gence, and told the jury that, if they believed that the plain-
tiff was negligent and that such negligence contributed in the 
slightest degree to the accident, etc., there could be no recov-
~ry. 
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''The language 'slightest degree' is a departure from that 
heretofore employed and approved by this court, and should 
not have been used. It was calculated to mislead and to visit 
upon the person injured all the consequences of the defend-
ants' negligence, although the shortcoming of the plaintiff 
may have been so trivial as to have really been without ap-
preciable effect. Further, the jury had already been suffi-
ciently instructed as to the plaintiff's contributory negligence, 
and the· instruction in question was properly rejected for that 
reason.'' 
~ee also City of Charlottesville v. Jones, 123 Va. 682, at 
page 703. Therefore, the Court was correct in refusing the 
instruction as offered on that ground, ·and was correct in 
amending the intsruction by striking that phrase from the 
instruction. 
(2) So far as c()Jlcerns the second O'bjection to the in-
struction, namely: "The latter part of the instruction di-
rects a verdict for the defendants irrespective of whethe:r 
the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence, or at least, 
the instruction does not make it clear that the· direction of a 
verdict for the defendants is dependent upon the jury be-
lieving· ·that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negli- . 
gence'' ; note that the instruction as offered after telling 
the jury that they could not return a verdict in favor of 
the plaintiff if" they believe that the plaintiff was guilty of 
contributory negligence; then adds, ''and your verdict must 
be for the defendant's''. Thus contained in the instruction 
as offered there are two directions· to find for the defend-
ants. The first direction is properly qualified by the jury 
finding that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence 
and is correctly stated; but the second direction is not so 
qualified, and is not dependent upon the jury finding the plain-
tiff guilty of contributory negligence, or at least, not so ex-
cept by inference; and in a simple proposition of the kind 
co-vered by the instruction there was no reason to confuse the 
jury or to leave anything to be inferred. It is submitted 
that the instruction as offered would have been confusing to 
the jury, and from it the jury might have understood that 
the ~Tudge was of opinion that the plaintiff 'vas guilty of con-
tributory negligence as a matter of law. The use of the word 
''also'' in the second direction was positively misleading 
to this effect. Therefore the Court was correct in refusing the 
instruction as offered and in striking· out the second direction 
to the jury contained in the instruction as offered. 
While the defendants would lu.ive been entitled to such an 
expression as ''even though you may believe that the defend-
-~- ~---- ~----
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ants were also guilty of negligence" as appended to the first 
direction if they had requested, they did not so request. Their 
objection and exception was to the refusal of the instruction 
as offered and to the granting of the instruction as amended. 
If the defendants had requested the Court to append such 
an expression as ''even though you may believe that the de-
fendants were also guilty of negligence'', to the first direc-
tion, the Court undoubtedly would have allowed it. But as 
stated they did not so request. They certainly were not en-
titled to the use of such an expression in the language of-
fered as appended to the second direction that was not prop-
erly predicated upon the jury finding· the plaintiff guilty of 
contributory negligence. 
It is submitted that the la'v is correctly stated in Sims v. 
Commonwealth, 134 Va. 736 at page 759, where the Court 
_A)_uotes from C. and 0. R. Co. v. Stock~ 104 Va. 97: 
'' 'If an instruction is right and there is evidence to sup-
port it, it should be given. If it be equivocal it should be 
amended. If it be wrong in form or substance, it should be 
rejected, and there is no obligation on the Court to correct it 
and then give it. A party cannot by asking an erroneous in-
struction, devolve upon the Court the duty of charging the 
jurv on the law of the case.' '' 
• I 
The Court, in the Sims case, then adds: 
"In the main we coneur in this statement of the law, but 
with this qualification, that if .the point upon which the in-
struction asked is a vital one, the jury should not be left 
wholly in the dark as to what the law on the subject is.'' 
It might be admitted that the question of contributory neg-
lig·ence is a vital point, and the Court should have amended 
the instruction, which it did. The instruction as amended 
clearly and unequivocally stated the law on the subject, and 
· it is submitted that there was no error in so doing. It is 
submitted that a party who presents an erroneous equivo-
eal or misleading instruction, which the Court amends to make 
correct, clear and unequivocal has no right after he has taken 
his chance with the jury to complain that the Court failed 
to transpose a matter of mere dressing, inducement or ar-
gument from the context to another place. 
The instruction as amended and granted correctly in-
structed the jury. It was clear and explicit and told the jury 
that if they believed from the evidence that the plaintiff was 
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guilty of contributory negligence the jury should find for the 
defendants. All the other instructions which set forth the 
circumstan~es under which the jury might find for the plain-
tiff are expressly predicated upon the plaintiff being free of 
eontributory negligence. 
Hence, it is submitted that the trial Court upon the trial 
was correct in refusing the instruction as offered and did not 
commit any error in amending the instruction. It is clear, 
therefore, that the trial Court was clearly in error in set-
ting aside the verdict and granting a ne'v trial as based on 
the ground of his action in reference to this Instruction A. 
As heretofore stated the action of the trial Court in setting 
aside the :first verdict was based on the ground of his action in 
reference to Instruction A. However, the Court in Certi:fi-
cae of Exceptions No. 4 says it was principally on that 
ground. but also on the other grounds named. Hence. we 
will proceed briefly to consider the other grounds assigned 
by th~ defendants in their motion to set aside the :first ver-
dict found in said Certificate of Exceptions. 
2. b~ Reference to Instruction No. J,.. 
Instruction No. 4 as granted at the request of the plain-
tiff reads as follows : 
''The Court instructs the jury that if you believe from the 
evidence that Joe Wright was free from negligence causing 
the accident and that the truck was operated at a speed greater 
than was reasonable and proper under all the circumstances, 
and that such speed proximately caused the accident, you 
~hould find for the plaintiff.'' 
To the granting of this instruction the defendants· ob-
jected on the following grounds as stated in Certificate of 
Exceptions No. 2: 
'' 1. That the law propounded in said instructions, though 
good as general abstract statements of law, have no appli-
cation to the case at bar. 
'' 3. That though instruction No. 4 properly instructs the 
jury realtive to excessive speed, it is improper in this case 
for there is ;no evidence that the speed of the truck, if exces-
sive, caused or contributed in any manner to the accident.'' 
Hence, it will be seen that at the trial of the case the de-
fendants admitted that the form of the instruction was 
proper, and their only objection 'vas that it had no appli-
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cation to the case. There is· no merit in this objection. The 
evi~ence showed tl1at the truck was being operated at a very 
high rate of speed, and that the operator lost control of it, 
and just before it got opposite the plaintiff's car swerved to 
the left and sideswipped the plaintiff's car, and ran a dis-
tance variously esimated at from not less than 150 feet to 
200-300 yards before stopping·, leaving a heavy skid mark. 
The driver of the truck admitted that at the previous trial he 
testified that he had covered a distance of 60 miles in one 
hour immediately preceding the accident in spite of several 
stops in that time. 
However, note Certificate of Exceptions Bin which the de-
fendants now claim that they objected to the instruction on 
the ground that it should have inserted ''or proximately con-
tributing to the cause of" after ''that Joe Wright was free 
from negligence causing'' in the first part of the instruction. 
Note further the statement in said Certificate of Exceptions 
B as follows: 
"But the Court has no recollection that such ground was 
stated or amendment requested on such ground." 
No such ground was stated and no such amendment was re-
quested. On the contrary, it will be noted, by reference to 
Certificate of Exceptions No. 2, that the defendants in stat-
ing their objection to Instruction No. 4 admitted that the 
form of the instruction was satisfactory. If the defendant had 
pointed out any formal defect, the Court would, we think, have 
amended it. But we submit that after the defendants had 
taken their chance with the jury on an instruction which they 
l1ad expressly .approved as to form, they should not after-
wards be heard to complain of a formal defect. The jury 
could not have been misled by the omission. There is no such 
omission in the other instructions. It is, therefore, submit-
ted that there was no predudicial error on the part of the 
trial Court in granting Instruction No. 4. 
3. In Reference to Certificate of Exceptions A. 
This ground for the defendants' motion to set . aside the 
irerdict is stated as follows (Certificate of Exceptions No 4, 
page 28 of the typewritten record): 
'~ 3. That counsel for plaintiff committed prejudicial 
error in repeatedly asking certain questions relative to the 
nun1ber of trucks the defendants operated, after objections to 
said questions, made by defendants, had been sustah;ted by 
the Court as set out in Oertificate of Exceptions A.'' · 
,_ 
' 
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Turning then to Certificate of Exceptions A we note that 
after Joe Perry, the operator of the defendant's truck, had 
testified that he made two or three trips to Baltimore carry-
ing produce to market during the trucking season, counsel for 
plaintiff, on cross-examination, asked the witness this ques-
tion: "Isn't it a fact that you people are engaged in the haul-
ing business and operate a fleet of trucks t'' Counsel for the 
defendants objected to the question,. and the objection was sus-
tained. It is submitted that the question was a natural one 
in view of the testimony relative to the frequency of the 
trips made by he defendants. However, inasmuch as the 
Court sustained the objection there was certainly no error 
prejudicial to the defendants. 
Thereafter, C. A. Wright, one of the defendant co-owners 
of the truck, testifying on his own behalf, testified that he 
was a farmer and had only one truck. On cross-examina-
tion counsel for the plaintiff asked the following ques-
tion: "Isn't it a faet that you and your brother (J. R. 
vV right, the other co-owner of the truck) operate a number 
of trucks¥'' Counsel for the defendants objected to the ques-
tion, and the Court sustained the objection. It is submit-
ted that inasmuch as Mr. Wright had testified in direct exami-
nation that he had only one truck, counsel for the plaintiff was 
within his rights in cross-examining him along this line, and 
that the Court erred in sustaining the objection. The error 
of the Court in sustaining the objection 'vas an error against 
the plaintiff; but inasmuch as the verdict was in favor of 
the plaintiff the error was immaterial. It seems clear that 
there was no error against the defendants. 
J. R. Wright, the other co-o,vner of the truck, was then 
called as a 'vitness for the defendants, and on cross-examina-
tion was asked how many trucks he and his brother, C. A. 
Wright, owned. Counsel for the defendants objected, and 
the objection was sustained. This question was proper in 
view of the testimony of C. A. Wright, above referred to. 
Again the Court erred against the plaintiff. There was cer-
tainly no error prejudicial to the defendants. 
4. In Reference to the Plaintiff being G~tilty of Contribu-
tory N e,qligence. 
I 
. ., 
The fourth ground assigned by the defendants for their mo-
tion to set aside the verdi~t is their claim that the plaintiff 
was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. It 
is submitted that a perusal of the evidence 'vill clearly show 
that there is no merit to this g-round. We think that the evi-
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. dence contained in the record clearly shows that the question 
of the primary negligence of the defendants and contribu-
tory negligence of the plaintiff were jury questions. There-
fore, we deem it unnecessary to discuss this point. This could 
not have constituted the ground of setting asid_e the verdict, 
because if it did, the trial Court would have. ended the case 
after the first verdict and rendered final judgment for the 
defendants without the n~cessity of a new trial. 
Threfore, the jury having found its verdict for the plain-
tiff the question of contributory negligence is answered in 
favor of the plaintiff. And the trial Court should have ren-
dered final judgment for the plaintiff on the :first verdict. 
PRAYER. 
For the reasons above set forth, the Circuit Court of Nor-
folk County, as your petitioner is advised and now charges, 
clearly erred to the prejudice of your petitioner in its rulings 
and judgment· aforesaid. Wherefore, your petitioner· prays 
this Honorable Court to grant him a writ-of-error, without 
supersed~as, to the judgment aforesaid, and review and re-
verse said judgment, and render final judgment in favor of 
your petitioner on the first verdict in his favor. 
Copy of this petition was delivered to opposing counsel 
in the trial Court on the 1st day of May, 1935. Petitioner de-
sires to adopt this petition as his brief. Counsel desires to 
state orally the reasons for reviewing the decision complained 
of. · 
JOSEPH WRIGHT, 
an infant, suing by Cafelia .Foreman, his next friend, 
· By RIXEY ~ RIXEY, Counsel. 
I, John S. Rixey, an attorney-at-law practicing in the Su-
preme Court of Appeals of . Virginia, do certify that in my 
opinion it is proper that the judgment and decision com-
plained of in the foregoing petition should be reviewed by 
said Court. · 
Received Ma.y 1. 19R5. 
.TOHN S. RIXEY. 
.T. W. E. 
Writ of Error granted. Bond $200.00. May 13, 1935. 
J. W. EGGLESTON. 
Received May 14. 1935. 
.M. B. WATTS, Clerk. 
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RECORD 
VIRGINIA: 
Pleas before the Circuit Court of Norfolk County on the 
6th day of April. 19~5. 
BE IT REME~IBERED, that heretofore, to-wit: On the 
15th day of September, 1934, came the plaintiff, Joseph 
W rig·ht an infant suing by Cafelia .F·oreman, his next friend, 
and filed his Notice of Motion against Joe Perry, J. R. Wright 
and C. A. V\7right, in the words and figures following, to-wit: 
Joseph Wright, an infant suing by Cafelia Foreman, his next 
friend, Plaintiff, 
v. 
~Toe Perry, J. R. Wright and C. A. Wright, Defendants. 
NOTICE OF' MOTION FOR JUDGlVIENT. 
To: Joe Perry, Jarvisburg, North Carolina; J. R. Wright, 
Jarvisbur,g·, North Carolina: 0. A. Wright, Jarvisburg, 
North Carolina: 
TAKE NOTICE, That on the 1st day of October, 1934, 
at 10:00 o'clock in the forenoon or as soon thereafter. as 
counsel can be heard the undersigned will move the Cir-
cuit Court of Norfolk Countv in the Court Room of said 
Court in Portsmouth, Virginia, for a judgment and award of 
execution against you and each of you for the sum of Ten 
Thousand ($10,000) Dollars and the costs of this proceeding, 
for damages for this, to-wit: 
That heretofore, to-wit, on or about the 27th day of Au-
gust, 1934, on the Portsmouth-Suffolk Boulevard between 
Bower's Hill and the "U and I" cabins in the 
page 2} County of Norfolk, State of Virginia, you and each 
of you did so carelessly and negligently operate a 
certain automobile truck then and there owned anrl operated 
by each of you, as to collide with a certain automobile in 
which the undersigned infant, Joseph Wright, was riding. As / 
the result of which the undersigned was greatly crushed, cut,, 
broken and injured in and about his person, his arm injured 
to such an extent that it had to be amputated, and the under-
signed was, and will in the future be caused to suffer great 
- ------~-----------------
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physical pain and mental anguish, and has been, and will be, 
caused to expend large sums of money in endeavoring to be 
cured of his said injuries, and has been and will in the future 
be, caused to lose large sums of money in and about his busi-
ness, which h~ otherwise would have earned, and his earning 
capacity and physical functions seriously and peramnently 
impaired, to the damage of the undersigned in the sum of Ten 
Thousand ($10,000) Dollars, all as the result of the careless-
ness and negligence of each of you. 
That at the time of the accident, ever since and now, you 
were and are non-residents of the State of Virginia. That 
your post offi'ce address is Jarvisburg, North Carolina. That 
you have appointed the Director of the Division of Motor 
Vehicles of Virginia and his successors in office, as your true 
and lawful attorney upon whom may be served process in 
this action. 
JOSEPH WRIGHT, 
An Infant Suing by Cafelia Foreman, his next Friend, 
By RIXEY & RIXEY, Counsel. 
And at another day, to-wit: On the 1st day of October, 
1934, the following order was entered: 
· page 3 ~ This day came the plaintiff by his Attorneys, and 
on their motion, it is ordered that this case be 
docketed, and. the defendants appeared by Foreman, Pender 
and Dyer, their Attorneys, and pleaded "not g·uilty", to 
w.hich the plaintiff replied generally, and on which plea is-
sue is joined: thereupon on· motion of the said defendants, 
leave is giyen them to file special pleas. 
And at another day, to-wit: On the 18th day of October, 
1934, the following plea of the general issue was filed: 
The said defendants, by their Attorneys, come and say 
that they are not guilty of the premises in this action laid 
to their charge, in the manner and from the plaintiff hath 
complained in said notice of motion. And of this the said 
defendant put themselves upon the country. 
FOREMAN, PENDER & DYER, 
Attorneys for defendants. 
And on the same day, to-wit: On the 18th day of October, 
1934, the defendants, Joe Perry, J. R. Wright and C. A .. 
Wright filed the following plea of contributory" negligence: 
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The said defendants by their attorneys come and say that 
the plaintiff is guilty of negligence, and that such negligence 
was the proximate cause, or proximate contributing cause, of 
the accident and injury complained of in plaintiff's notice 
of motion for judgment. And this the defendants are ready 
to verify. 
FOREMAN, PENDER & DYER, 
Attorneys for defendants. 
And on the same day, to-wit: On the 18th day of Octo-
ber, 1934, the defendants J. R. Wright and C. A. Wright, filed 
the following notice of cross claim: 
page 4 } 'l1o: Joseph "\V right, 
.. 
Norfolk County, Virginia. 
TAKE NOTICE that we J. R. Wrig·ht and C. A. Wright, 
defendants in the above. entitled notice of motion for judg-
ment, hereby cross claim in the said proceeding for our dam-
ages to our automobile arising out of the same transaction 
mentioned and described in the notice of motion for judgment 
herein by reason of the fact that yon in the operation of an 
automobile on the 23rd day of August,-1934, as described in 
the notice of motion, negligently, recklessly and in utter dis-
·regard for the right of' ourselves and others using the high-
way and without maintaining a proper lookout for other au-
tomobiles in general and our automobile truck in particular, 
and without having your car properly equipped with brakes, 
and without using said brakes, and without having your car 
properly equipped with headlights, and without having proper 
control over the same, drove your car upon and into ou1 au-
tomobile truck, damaging the same and causing loss and sun-
dry particulars to the extent of Three Hundred ($300.00) Dol-. 
lars, for which said sum we shall at the hearing of the cause 
ask judgment and award of execution against you. 
J. R. 'VRIGHT and 
C . .A. 'VRIGHT, 
By FOR.E~IAN, PENDER & DYER, 
Their Attorneys. 
And on the same day, to-wit: On the 18th day of Octo-
ber, 1934;, the following order was entered : 
This day came again the parties by their Attorneys and 
a Jury, to-wit: T. E. Etheridge, R. J. Townsend, I-I. J. 
Osmundson, J. J. Cooper, J. W. Basnight, T. W. Parker and 
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C. H. 'Vard, who were duly sworn the truth to 
page 5 ~ speak upon the issue joined, and after having fully 
heard the evidence ·in behalf of the plaintiff, the 
' defendants, moved the Court to strike out said evidence, which 
motion the Court. overruled, and to which action of the Court 
in overruling said motion and refusing to ·strik~ out the 
plaintiff's evidence, the de~endants, by Counsel, excepted 
Thereupon after the jury heard the evidence and argu-
ment of Counsel, they retired to their room to consult of a 
verdict, and after sometime ·returned into Court and said that 
they could not agree upon a verdict, and it is ordered that 
the said Jury be adjourned until Monday morning at ten 
o'clock. 
And at another day, to-wit: On the 22nd day of October, 
1934, the following order was entered: 
This day came again the parties· by their Attorneys, and 
the Jury sworn on Thursday, October 18th, 1934 to try this 
ca~e, came in pursuance to their adjournment, and after hav-
ing fully heard the evidence and argument of Counsel, retired 
to their room to consult of a verdict, and after sometime re-
turned into Court and said that they could not agree upon a 
verdict. Thereupon it is ordered that the said jury be dis-
charged. 
And at another day, to-wit: On the 18th day of December, 
1934 the following· order was entered: 
This day came the ·parties by their Attorneys, and by con-
sent of parties, it is ordered that this case be tried by six 
jurors. Thereupon came a Jury, to-wit: M. L. Gibbs, C. W. 
Rodgers, L. P. Waldo, W. T. Buxton, G. E. ·Lilley and George 
T. Keville, who were duly sworn the truth to speak upon the 
issue joined, and after having partly heard the evi-
page 6 ~ dence, it is ordered-that this case be continued until 
tomorrow morning· ~t ten o'clock. 
And at another day, to-wit: On the 19th day of Decem-
ber, 1934, the following order was entered: 
This day came again the parties by their Attorneys, and 
the jury appeared in Court in pursuance to their adjourn-
ment on yesterday, and after having· fully heard the evi-
dence and argument of Counsel, retired to their room to con-
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suit of a verdict, and after sometime returned into Court, hav-
ing found the following verdict: "We the jury find for the 
plaintiff and fix the damages at $2,000.00. '' 
Thereupon the defendants moved the Court to set aside 
the verdict of the jury in this. case and grant them a new trial, 
uopn the ground that the same is contrary to the law and the 
evidence, the hearing of which· motion is continued. 
And at another day, to-wit: On the 12th day of J anu-
ary, 1935, the following o_rder was entered: 
This day came again the parties by their Attorneys and 
the Court having fully heard the motion to set aside the ver-
dict of the Jury in this case and gTant the defendants a ne\v 
trial, doth take time to consider of its judgment, and this case 
is continued. 
And at another day, to-wit: On the 28th day of January, 
1935, the following order was entered: 
This day came again the parties by their Attorneys, and 
the Court having fully heard and considered tJ:te motion of 
the defendants to set aside the verdict of the Jury in this 
case and grant them a new trial, doth sustain the same, to 
which action of the Court the plaintiff excepted. 
page 7 ~ Thereupon it is ordered that a ne\v trial be and 
had herein; and it is further ordered that the de-
fendants pay the costs of this case to date. 
And at another day, to-wit: On the 8th day of March, 
1935 the following order was entered: 
This day came again the parties by their Attorneys, and 
\vith the consent of all parties, it is ordered that this case be 
tried by six jurors; thereupon came a Jury, to-wit: J. C. 
Eason, J. R. Cooper, A.M. Bryant, -Fred Halstead, J. V. Car-
ney and Truman Eaver, who were duly sworn the truth to 
speak upon the issue joined, and after having fully heard the 
evidence and argument of Counsel, retired to their room to 
consult of a verdict, and after sometimes returned into Court, 
having found the following verdict: "We the jury :find for 
the defendants.'' -
Thereupon the plaintiff moved the Court to set aside the·ver-
dict of the jury· in this case, as contrary to the law and the 
evidence, and render judgment for the plaintiff on the :firf.t 
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verdict, on the grounds that the Court erred in setting aside 
the first verdict; and further, in the event the Court over-
rules this motion, the plaintiff moves the Court to set aside 
the verdict and grant him a new trial, the hearing of which 
motions is continued. 
And at another day, to-wit: On the 30th day of March, 
1935 the following order was entered: 
This day came again the parties by their Attorneys, and 
the Court having fully heard and considered the motions of 
the plaintiff to set aside the verdict of the jury in this case 
and render judgment for the plaintiff on the first verdict, and 
also to set aside the verdict of the Jury and grant 
page 8 r a new trial on the second verdict, doth overrule 
the same, to which action of the Court in overruling 
said motions the plaintiff, by counsel, excepted. 
Thereupon it is considered by the Court that the plain-
tiff take nothing by his suit, but for his false clamor be in 
mercy, etc., and that the defendants recover against the plain-
tiff his costs in this behalf expended. 
And at another day, to-wit : On the 6th day of April, 1935, 
the following order was entered : 
This day eame the parties by their attorneys, and the plain-
tiff tendered his four certificates of exceptions numbered 1, 
2, 3 and 4, and the defendants tendered their certificates of 
exceptions a and b, all of which were received and signed by 
the Court and ordered to be made a part of the record_in this 
case, and after it duly appeared in writing that the attorneys 
for the defendants had been given reasonable notice in writ-
ing of the time and place of the tendering said certificates of 
exception. 
Note: The certificates of exceptions above referred to are 
as follows: 
page 9 r Virginia : 
In the Circuit Co_!lrt of Norfolk County. 
Joseph \V right, an infant, suing by Cafelia Foreman, his next 
friend, Plaintiff, 
v. 
Joe Perry, J. R. Wright, and C. A. Wright, Defendants. 
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PL.A.INTIFF'S. CERTIFICATE OF EXCEP·TIONS NO. 1. 
I 
Be it remembered that on the trial of this case that oc-
curred on December 18th and 19th, 1~34, the following evi-
dence as hereinafter set forth was introduced by the parti~s 
hereinafter shown, which is the evidence and is all the evi-
dence introduced at the said trial of this case, to-wit: 
JOHN STATEMAN, 
on behalf of the plaintiff, being duly sworn, testified as fol-
lows: 
I owned the automobile driven by the plaintiff at the time 
of the accident on August 27th, 1934. The following were the 
only occupants of my car at the time of the aooident; Joe 
Wright was sitting on the front seat on the left and was 
driving; I 'vas sitting beside him; and Mable Edwards was 
sitting on the rear seat. We had been to Suffolk, Virginia; 
and at the time of the accident were proceeding East towards 
Portsmouth along the new Suffolk-Portsmouth 
page 10 r Boulevard well over on the right hand side of 
the road at about 20-25 miles per hour. The ac-
cident occurred in Norfolk County, Virginia, about 200-300 
yards East of the U and I Cabins, a mile or so before reach-
ing Bower's Hill. The accident occurred between 7 and 8 
P. M., anrl it was dark and our head'lights were burning. I 
sa"r the head lights of the truck approaching us from the 
direction of Portsmouth, and the truck appeared to be on its 
right side of the road. There were no marker lights on 
the truck. After the accident I noticed three small lights 
over the sun visor of the cab on the truck. We were well 
over on our side of the road and remained so. Just before 
the truck got opposite me I saw the truck cut to its left into 
our car. The overhang of the body of the truck struck the 
front left door of my car. J\fy front left wheel was cut down, 
and my car stopped immediately. When my car stopped it 
was still well over on our right side of the concrete. The 
truck was travelling very fast ·which I estimate to have been 
45-50 miles per hour. The truck did not stop until it got to 
the U and I cabins. My car was not moved until Mr. McPher-
son arrived. 
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MABEL EDWARDS, 
on behalf of the plaintiff, .being duly sworn, testified as 
follnws: 
.I was riding on the back seat of the car driven by the 
plaintiff. At the time of the accident it was dark and between 
. and 7 and 8 P. M. We were traveling about 20-25 
page 11 ~ miles per hour. We were well over on our right 
side of the concrete with the right wheels about a 
foot from the right hand edge of the concrete and never got 
to the left of the center of the concrete. There were no 
marker lights on the truck. I saw the head lights of the 
truck approaching and they appeared to be on their. side of 
the road. Just before the truck got opposite us it cut to its 
left into us and struck us. Our car stopped where it was 
struck. When I got out our car was stopped all to the right 
of the center of the road, and the truck was at the U and I 
Cabins. 
A. W. ~IcPHERSON, 
on behalf of the plaintiff, being· duly sworn, testified as fol-
lows: 
I operate an automobile repair shop in Portsmouth. I 
was called to the scene of the accident and arrived on the 
scene between 9-10 P. M., with my wrecking truck. When 
I arrived on the scene the car that had been driven by the 
plaintiff was standing on the right hand side of the road 
facing Ports1nouth slightly at an angle with t'li'e road with its 
right rear wheel on the edge of the concrete on the right side 
and 'the front of the car near the center but to the right of 
· the center. The front left wheel of the car was broken 
down. I backed my truck (wrecking) to the front of the car 
where I repaired it. The head lights and radiator on the 
car were not damaged. There was a scraped mark 
page 12 ~ along the left side of the car from the front door 
back about the same height as the floor of the body 
of truck. I examined the truck at the U and I Cabins. The 
forward point of the overhang of the body on the l~ft side 
of the truck showed the result of a collision; and starting 
there there was blood and flesh along the side of. the body of 
the truck. The body of the truck extended about two feet 
beyond the front fender extremes on each side, and the truck 
was about eight feet high. There were no marker lights on 
the front top corners of the truck. The left front wheel of 
the plaintiff's car was pushed back under the motor and the 
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left front fender was damaged beyond repair. The gas tank 
of the truck was mashed in. 
JOE PODRUCHNY, 
on behalf of the plaintiff, being duly sworn, testified as 
follows: 
I am the proprietor of the U and I Cabins. I heard the 
collision, but did not see it. Upon hearing the collision I 
went to the scene of the accident. I found the passenger 
car standing on the right side of the road facing to-
wards Portsmouth at an angle with the road with the rear 
right wheel off the concrete on the right side. I noticed a 
black skid mark made by the truck starting in about the cen-
ter the road and thence runing west and towards the left side 
of the road facing towards Suffolk. The next morning I 
stepped off this skid mark and it was over 50 
page· 13 ~ yards long. 
JOSEPH WRIGHT, 
the plaintiff, being duly sworn, testified as follows: 
I am the plaintiff, and am 19 years old. Before the acci-
dent I worked for the Pine Grove Dairy at one dollar a 
day. Since the accident I have not been able to work. I was 
driving the Stateman car at the time of the accident, which 
was a Chevrolet Sedan. The accident occurred between·: 7 
and 8 P. ·]\f., on August 27th, 1934 and it was dark. I ha:d 
been to Suffolk and was returning home traveling towards 
Portsmouth. I was traveling about 20-25 miles per hour. 
I was well over on my right hand side of the concrete road 
and no part of my car got to the left of the center of the 
road. l\fy head lights were burning. I saw the head lights 
of the truck coming towards me and saw three small lights 
over the sun visor and knew that such visor lights were not 
customary on passenger car, but did not know what kind of 
vehicle it was. As the truck approached me it appeared to 
be over on its right side of the road; and then when it got 
opposite me the truck cut to its left into m:y car; and the for-
ward end of the over hang of the body of the truck struck the 
front door of my car where I was sitting. The door where 
I was sitting was the first point of contact on my car. I 
stopped immediately. 1\£y left arm was resting in the win-
dow on the door. There were no marker lights on the truck. 
My left arm was broken, and the flesh of the arm 
page 14 ~ was torn off, and the arm badly mangled. I was 
taken to the hospital at Portsmouth where Dr. Bar-
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ro.w cut off the arm just below ·the shoulder.· I have only 
one- arm now. Before the accident I had no trouble with 
my arms. My hospital bill was $28.50. I was picked up by 
a passing automobile shortly after the accident and carried 
to the hospital. 
DR. F. P. BARROW, II, 
on behalf of the plaintiff, being duly sworn, testified as fol-
lo,vs: 
I am a physician practicing in Portsmouth, Virginia, 1 sa'v 
the plaintiff at the hospital between 10:30-11 P. M. on August 
27th, 1934 and treated him for his injuries. The left arm of 
the plaintiff was so badly mangled and torn that it could not 
be saved, and I cut it off just below the shoulder. My bill 
is $100.00. 
Thereupon the plaintiff rested. 
CHARLES J. DEANS, 
on behalf of the defendants, being duly s'vorn, testified as 
follows: 
I am an employee of the Virginia Electric and Power Com-
pany and knew none of the parties to the suit prior to the 
aooident. I arrived at the scene of the accident shortly after 
10 P. M. The Chevrolet was practically in the center of the 
concrete road and traffic was passing on 1both side of the car. 
There was some dirt on the road where the car was sitting. 
I examined the rear wheels of the truck. The 
page 15 ~ left rear wheels of the truck appeared to be 
knocked back a few inches out of alignment. The 
g-.as tank on the truck, which was just forward of the left rear 
wheels of the truck under the over hang of the body, was 
damaged. There was a marker light burning at the extreme 
lower right hand corner of the body in front and the remains 
of a smashed light :fixture at the extreme lower left hand cor-
ner of- the bodv where it had been knocked off. There were 
no marker lights at the top of the body. No part of the 
truck was damaged for,vard of the front end of the body. 
I noticed a spot of grease about 18 inches from the truck's 
right edge of the concrete about opposite scraped place on 
road. The rear housing of the truck was broken. I saw 
Podruchny at the scene of the accident and he was drunl{.· 
The car was standing a short distance from the scraped place 
on the road. Opposite the scraped place I noticed tire marks 
well on the truck's side of the roap. 
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L. R. PEEL, 
on behalf of the defendants, being. duly sworn, testified as 
follows: 
I arrived on the scene of the aecident a little after 10 P. 
M. The Chevrolet was standing .in about the center of the 
road. I saw a skid mark slightly to right, opposite scraped 
place, and oil towards the right of center· of the highway, 
facing Suffolk. 
H. E. BR·YANT, 
on behalf of the defendants, being duly sworn, testified as 
follows: 
I am a State Officer (Traffic) and went to the scene of the 
accident between 10-11 P. M. The Chevrolet car 
page 16 ~ was standing in about the center of the road, on 
an angle. Traffic was routed around the car to 
the right facing Suffolk, Virginia. I do not remember seeing 
any oil or grease on the road. The road is a concrete road 
18 feet wide at the point of the accident. I saw a scraped 
place on the concrete which looked as if it might have been 
made by the left front wheel of the Chevrolet car as it went 
do,vn on the concrete. This mark measured one inch from 
the center of the concrete on the Chevrolet's · side of the road. 
There was a black skid mark starting at a point about oppo-
site the scraped place that measured 7'tY' from the truck's 
right edge of the road and 10'6" from the Chevrolet's edge . 
. These measurell}.ents were made by me the next morning in 
the presence of counsel for the plaintiff. From that point 
the skid mark went to the left going towards Suffolk until 
it was about 2 or 3 feet from the Chevrolet's edge of the road 
and then went back on the opposite side of the road. That 
skid mark was not less than 75 yards in length. It appeared 
to ·be a black skid mark made by the application of brakes 
and not from a wheel thrown orit of line. 
JOHN WRIGHT, JR., 
on behalf of the defendants, being duly sworn, testified as 
follow.s: 
I am the son of the defendant, J. R. Wright. I was riding 
on the truck at the time of the accident. We left home at Jar-
.· . visburg, N. C. at about 7:30 P. M. We stopped 
page 17 ~ about 9 o'clock at Deep ·Creek where we got a coca-
cola and a sandwich and found all lights burning. 
'rhe accident occurred about 9 :30 P. M. w·e were traveling 
25-30 miles per hour at 'the time of the accident, having shortly 
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before turned on the boulevard after a stop at the boulevard. 
Our truck was loaded with sweet potatoes which we were car-
rying to Baltimore, Maryland. We were traveling 'veil over 
on our right side of the road going West towards Suffolk. I 
saw the plaintiff's car down the road coming to us. The 
plaintiff's car struck the left side of the truck. The truck 
ran about 60-75 yards up the road before stopping. All our 
lights were burning at the time of the accident. I saw Joe 
Prodruchny and he was drunk. He offered me a drink. I saw 
a\ mark made by the left tires of our truck when thrown out 
of line, and it was well on our side of the road, beginning about 
opposite the sera ped place near the center of the road. I 
saw gTease and oil on· the truck's right side of concrete, al-
most opposite where tire marks began . 
. TOE PERRY. 
one o£ the defendants, being duly sworn, testified as follows: 
I was driving the truck involved in the collision with the 
plaintiff's car. We left Jarvisburg, N. C. about sundown. 
Lights were turned on at Coinjock, N. C. At the 
page 18 ~ time of the accident I was traveling about 25 miles 
per hour and was well over on my side of the road 
very close to the edge of the concrete. I saw the lights of the 
car coming; to me, and the car app~ared to be zig-zagging. The 
car ran into the side of n1v truck. As the result of the col-
lison my left rear wheels ~ere knocked back, and the brakes 
on the truck \Vere put out of commission and. with great diffi-
culty I maintained control of the truck, and it stopped about 
50-75 yards down the road. After the accident the left rear 
wheels revolved with difficulty. .After I stopped I drove the 
truck up to the U and I Cabins. The lights on the front were 
burning as follows: two head lights, three small lights over 
the sun visor of the cab, and a marker light at each lower 
corner of the body of the truck. There were no marker lights 
at the top of the body of the truck in front. My truck was 
loaded with 135 hushels of sweet potatoes, and I was bound 
for Baltimore, 1\faryland. It is about 60 miles between Jar-
visburg, N. C. and the place where the accident occurred. 
At a previous trial of this case at which there was a hung 
jury I testified that we left Jarvisburg about 7:30 P. M. and 
that the accident occurred about 8 :30 P. M., and that I cov-
ered the distance of about 60 miles in about one hour. How-
ever in testifying so at the previous trial was mistaken and 
confused; and, as a matter of fact, it took me about two hours 
to cover the 60 miles. ·All ~y lights were burning 
page 19 ~ at the time of the accident. 
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C. A. WRIGHT, 
one of the defendants, being duly sworn, testified as follows: 
I am one of the defendants in this action and the truck 
belonged to me and my brother, J. R. Wright. It is a regu-
lar Chevrol4?t farm truck. On the night of the accident I 
received notice of the accident and went to the scene of the 
accident. I found near the scene of the accident a trail of 
grease that had come from the rear end of the truck starting 
about a foot from the truck's edge of the concrete which 
I followed to the U and I Cabins. The left rear wheels of 
the truck had been knocked out of line a few inches, and the 
rear end of the truck had been broken and grease emptied 
out. The mark made by the truck was on the truck's right side 
of the road. The truck was equipped with head lights, three 
small lights over the sun visor of the cab and marker lights 
at the extreme lower right and left corners of the body. The 
truck was not equipped with marker lights at the top left and 
right corners of the body. The gas tank in the truck was 
mashed in and the contents leaked out. There was no dam-
age to the truck forward of the front end of the body. 
J. R .. vVRIGHT. 
one of the defendants, being duly sworn, testified as follows: 
I am one of the defendants in this action. The body of 
the truck is a little less than 7 feet high, and ex-
page 20 r tends 73,4 inches beyond the front fender extremes 
on each side. The truck left Jarvisburg about 
7 :30 P. M. I did not go to the scene of the accident. The 
truck was equipped with lights as follows: head lights, three 
small lights over the sun visor of the cah, and marker lights 
at the extreme lower left and right corners of the body. The 
truck was not equipped with marker lights at the upper left 
and right hand corners of the body. 
Thereupon the defendants rested. 
After all the evidence was in the defendants moved the 
court to strike the evidence on the ground that the plaintiff 
was guilty of contributory negligence, which motion the 
court overruled, to which action the defendants excepted. 
Teste: This 6th day of April, 1935. 
C. W. COLE~I.A...l\T, .Jndge. 
2'\l Supreme _Court of ~ppeals of Virginia. 
page 21 r PL.AINTIFF''S CERTIFICATE OF EXCEP-
TIONS NO. 2. 
Be it remembered that at the trial of this case on Decem-
ber 18th and 19th, 1934 the following instructions were 
granted and given to the jury, they being all the instructions 
that were granted, the in~tructions Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 being 
granted at the request of the plaintiff, to the granting of 
each of which the defendants excepted; and instructions 
A, B, C and D were granted at the request of the defendants : 
1. 
The Court instructs the jury that if you believe from the 
evidence that Joe Wright was free from negligence that 
caused or directly contributed to the accident in which he was 
injured, and if you believe that the facts presented show by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the def.endant Joe Perry 
.was guilty of negligence in operating the truck on the wrong 
. side of the road or in failing to have the marker lights re-
quired by law as shown in instruction No. 2, and if you fur-
ther beli~ve that such negligence was the cause of the acci-
dent in which Joe Wright was injured, then you should find 
·your verd5ct for the plaintiff. 
2. 
page 22 ~ The Court instructs the jury that the law re-
quires that, ''all motor vehicles exceeding seven 
feet in height or in width, or the widest portion of which 
extends four inches bevond the front fender extremes shall 
be equipped with lamps mounted at the extreme right and 
left hand front top corners of such vehicles, each of 
which lamps shall be capable of projecting a green light visi-
ble under normal atmospheric conditions for a distance of 
at least 200 feet to the front of such vehicle". 
You are further instructed that if vou believe from the evi-
dence that the truck of the defendant comes within the mean-
ing of the above law, and that it failed to comply with said 
law, and that such failure was the proximate cause of the 
accident, without negligence on the part of the plaintiff, your 
your verdict should be for the plaintiff. 
3. 
The Court instructs the jury that if you find for the plain-
tiff you should assess his damages at such a sum as you may 
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believe from the evidence to be a fair; and just compensation 
to him for: 
( 1) The pain and suffering to which the plaintiff has been 
subjected and will be subjected in the future (if any) as the 
result of the accident; and 
(2) The expenses to which the plaintiff has been subjected 
in attempting to be cured as the result of said accident; and 
(3)" The value of the time lost by the plaintiff (if any) 
resulting from the accident; and 
page 23 } ( 4) The diminution of the plaintiff's earning 
capacity (if any) resulting from the loss of his 
arm; and 
( 5) The I oRR of l1iR :1.rro. 
4. 
The Court instructs the jury that. if you believe from the 
evidence that .roe Wright was free from negligence causing 
the accident and that the truck was operated at a speed that 
was greater than was reasonable and proper under all the 
circumstances and that such speed proximately caused the 
accident you should find for the plaintiff. 
A. 
The Court instructs the jury that you cannot return a ver-
dict in favor of th~ plaintiff in this case if you believe from 
the evidence that he was guilty of any act of negligence ~hat 
caused, or proximately contributed to the cause- of the acci-
dent. 
B. 
The Court instructs the jury that the law provides that 
drivers of vehicles proceeding in opposite directions shall 
pass each other to the right, each giving to the other as nearly 
as possible one-half of the main traveled portion of the high-
way. If you believe from the evidence in this case that the 
plaintiff, or both plaintiff and defendants faile~ to 
page 24 ~ comply with this law and that such failure on the 
part of the plaintiff or on the part of both plaintiff 
and defendants, proximately contributed to the cause of the 
accident, then your verdict must be for the defendants. 
c. 
The Conrt instructs the jury that even though you may be-
lieve from the evidence that the defendant's truck was not 
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lighted in strict accordance with the law, or that the marker 
lights were not placed on the top right and left front cor-
ners of the body in strict accordance with the law of this 
State, you can not find for the plaintiff on that account un-
less you believe from the evidence that such violation of law 
proximately contributed to the cause of the accident. 
D. 
The Court instructs the jury that the burden is on the 
plaintiff to prove his case by a preponderance of the evidence 
and that this must be done by clear and positive evidence and 
not by conjecture or supposition. 
The Court further instructs you that if, after carefully 
weighing the evidence, taking into consideration all the facts 
and circumstances of the mise, you are unable to decide 
whether or not the defendants were neglig·ent, and you be-
lieve that it is just as probable that they were not negligent 
as they were, then you must find for the defend-
page 25 ~ ants. 
To the giving of instructions No. 1, 2 and 4 the defend-
ants objected on the following grounds: 
1. That the la'v propounded in said instructions though 
good as general abstract statements of law, have no applica-
tion to the case at bar. 
2. That though instructions numbers 1 und 2 properly 
set out the law as to requirements of marker lights and 
where same shall be placed, they are improper in this case 
for there is no evidence that the failure of the defendants 
to have marker lights or to have them in the proper place 
caused or contributed in any degree to the accident. 
3. That though instruction No. 4 properly instructs the 
jury relative to excessive speed, it is improper in this case 
for there is no evidence that the speed of the truck, if exces-
sive, caused or contributed in any manner to the accident. 
To the granting of each of these instructions the defend-
ant excepted. 
Teste: This the 6th day of April, 1935. 
A Copy T.este : 
C. W. COLEMAN, Judge. 
Judg~. 
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page 26.~ PLAINTIFF'S CE·RTIFCATE OF EXCEP-
TIONS NO.3. . 
Be it remembered that at the trial of this case on Decem-
ber 18th and 19th; 1934 the defendants offered the following 
instruction as Instruction A: 
A. 
The Court instructs the jury that you cannot return a 
verdict in favor of the plaintiff in this case if you believe from 
the evidence that he was guilty of any act of negligence that 
caused, or proximately contributed to the cause of the acci-
dent, however slight his negligence may have so contributed, 
and your verdict must be in favor of the defendants even 
though you may believe that they, the defendants, also were 
guilty of negligence. 
To the granting of this instruction as offered the plaintiff 
objected on the follo,ving grounds: (1) The phrase "however 
slight" was not proper and would mislead the ~Jury, and (2) 
The latter part of the instruction directs a verdict for the 
defendants irrespective of 'vhether the plaintiff was guilty 
of contributory negligence, or at least the instruction doe~ 
not make it clear that the direction of a verdict for the de-
fendants is dependent upon the Jury ~believing that the plain-
tiff was guilty of contributory negligence. There-
page 27 ~ upon the Court refused to grant the instruction as 
off~red, but amended the instruction and granted it 
as amended as Instruction A in the following words : 
A. 
The Court instructs the jury that you cannot return aver-
dict in favor of the plaintiff in this case if you believe from 
the evidence that he was guilty of any act of negligence that 
caused, or proximately contributed to the cause of the acci-
dent. · · 
To the action of the Court in refusing to grant this in-
struction as offered and in amending the same the defend-
ants excepted. 
Teste: This 6th day of April, 1935. 
C. W. COLEMAN, Judge. 
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page 28} PLAINTIFF'S CERTIFICATE OF EXCEP-
TIONS NO.4. 
Be it remembered that at the trial of this case on Decem-
ber 18th and 19th, 1934 after all the evidence was introduced 
as shown in Certificate of Exceptions No. 2, and after argu-
ment of counsel on both sides, the jury retired to consider 
their verdict and thereafter returned and rendered the fol-
lowing verdict: 
''We the jury find for the plaintiff and fix the damages 
at $2,000.00. 
M. L. GIBBS, Foreman.'' 
Thereupon the defendants moved the court to set aside 
the verdict of the jury and grant a new trial, on the follow-
ing grounds, without waiving other objections and. excep-
tions duly taken at the trial of the case: 
1. That the court erred in refusing to grant instruction A, 
as offered by the defendants, and erred further in granting 
instruction A as amended by the court as set forth in Excep-
tions No. 3. 
2. The Court erred in granting instruction No. 4, offered 
by the plaintiff, and further erred in refusing to amend said 
instruction as requested by the defendants as set out in cer-
tificate of exceptions No. B. 
3. That counsel for plaintiff committed prejudicial error in 
repeatedly asking certain questions relative to the 
page 29 ~ number of trucks the defendants operated, after ob-
jections to said questions, made by defendants, had 
been sustained by the court, as set out in Certificate of Excep-
tions A: 
4. That the evidence showed that the plaintiff was guilty of 
contributory negligence. 
Said motion having· been argued by counsel on a subsequent 
day the court sustained said motion, set aside the verdict and 
granted a new trial principally on the ground of the action of 
the court in reference to Instruction A as set forth in certifi-
cate of exceptions No. 3 but on all the other grounds named. 
To the action of the court in setting aside the verdict and 
granting a new trial and in refusing to render final judg-
ment for the plaintiff on the verdict, the plaintiff <luly ex-
cepted on the g-round that there had been no error prejudi-
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cial to the defendants in the action of the court in reference 
to Instruction A or otherwise prior to his action in setting 
aside the verdict; and that if there was error against the de-
fendants it was harmless. 
That thereafter to-wit, <>n the 8th day of March, 1935, an-
other trial of this case was had, resulting- in a verdict for the 
defendants. Thereupon the plaintiff moved the court to set 
aside thia second verdict, to vacate the order setting aside the 
first verdict, and to render final judgment for the plaintiff on 
the first verdict; which motion after argument by counsel on 
a subsequent day the court overruled and there-
pag-e 30 ~ upon rendered final judgment for the defendants. 
To the action of the court in refusing to set aside 
the second verdict and in refusing to vacate the order setting 
aside the :first verdict and in refusing- to render final judgment 
for the plaintiff on the first verdict, and in rendering final 
judgment for the defendants, the plaintiff duly excepted, on 
the ground that the court erred in setting aside the first ver-
dict and in granting a new trial and erred in refusing to ren-
der final judgment for the plaintiff on the first verdict. 
Teste: This 6th day of April, 1935. 
C. \V. COLEMAN, Judge. 
page 31 ~ DEFENDANTS' CERTIFICATE OF EXCEP-
TIONS NO. A. 
Be it remembered that at the trial of the case on Decem-
ber 18th and 19th, 1934, after witness Joe Perry testified that 
he made two or three trips to Baltimore, Maryland a week 
carrying· produce to market during trucking season, counsel 
for plaintiff asked defendant, Joe Perry, the.following ques-
tion: "Isn't it a fact that you people are engaged in the haul-
ing business and operate a fleet of trucks:'' The defense 
promptly objected to the question, which objection was sus-
tained by the court. 
Defendant, C. A. Wright, 'vas next called to the witness 
stand on his own behalf and after testifying on his own be-
half that he was a farmer that had only one truck, counsel for 
the plaintiff a.sked the following question: • 'Isn't it a fact 
that you and your brother operate a number of trucks," Ob-
jection was duly made to the question and was promptly sus-
tained by the court. 
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Defendant, J. R. Wright, was next called as a witness and 
during cross-examination by counsel for plaintiff was asked a 
question similar to those asked of the other two defendants 
regarding the number of trucks the defendants operated. 
Again the defense objected and again the court sustained the 
objection. 
Teste: This 6th day of April, 1935. 
C. W. COLE:NIAN, Judge. 
page 32 r DEFENDA.NTS' CERTIFICATE OF EXCEP-
TIONS NO. R. 
Be it remembered that a.t the trial of this case on Decem-
ber 18th and 19th, 1934, t.he plaintiff offered the following in-
struction as instruction No. 4. 
The Court instructs the jury that if yon· believe from the 
evidence that Joe Wright was free from negligence causing 
the accident and that the truck was operated at a speed 
greater than was reasonable and proper under all the circunl-
stances, and that such speed proximately caused the accident, 
yon should find for the plaintiff. 
To the granting of this instruction, the counsel for the de-
fendants objected and states positively that he assigned as 
ground for his objection that the instruction failed to instruct 
the jury on the proximate contributing cause, and states posi-
tively that he asked tr1e court to amend the instruction by in-
serting ''or proximately contributing to the cause of" as fol-
lows: 
The Court instructs the jury that if you believe from the 
evidence that Joe Wright was free from negligence causing or 
proximately contributing to the cause of the accident, and that 
the truck was operated at a speed greater than was reason-
able and proper under all the circumstances, and that such 
speed proximately caused the accident, you should find for 
the plaintiff. 
page 33 ~ But the Court has no recollection that such ground 
. was stated or amendment requested on such 
ground. To the giving· of this instruction No. 4 the defendant8 
excepted. 
Teste: This 6th day of April, 1935. 
C. W. COLE~1:AN, Judge. 
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page 34 ~ State of Virginia, 
County of Norfolk, to-wit: 
I, A. B. Carney, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Norfolk 
County, .State aforesaid, do hereby certify that the foregoing 
is a true transcript from the records in the case named. 
I further certify that said transcript was not made up and 
completed until the plaintiff had due notice of the making of 
the same. as required by law. 
Given under my hand, this the 15th day of April, 1935. 
A. B. CARNEY, Clerk, 
By L. S. BELTON, 
Deputy Clerk. 
A Copy-Teste : 
~I. B. WATTS, C. C. 
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